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"Probability is the very guide of life," in Bishop Butler's famous phrase. He
does not mean, of course, that calculations about dice are the guide of life but
that real decision making involves an essential element of reasoning with uncertainty. Humans have coped with uncertainty without the benefit of advice
from mathematicians, both before and after Pascal and Fermat's discovery of
the mathematics of probability in 1654.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Behavioral studies indicate that individuals do not always make
objective decisions about risk. 2 Various cognitive biases and heuristics-mental shortcuts everyone uses consciously or subconsciously to
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty-introduce error and
subjectivity. 3 At one level, these studies merely confirm the obvious:
individuals make decisions based on both reason and emotions. At another level, they may introduce serious complications into some types
of legal analysis, which are based on the assumption that individuals
4
are rational actors.
The potential effects of erroneous decisions about risk are of particular concern in the area of tort law. 5 Laboratory studies establish that
1. JAMES FRANKLIN, THE SCIENCE OF CONJECTURE: EVIDENCE AND PROBABILITY
BEFORE PASCAL, at ix (2001) (quoting JOSEPH BUTLER, The Analogy of Religion, in
THE WORKS OF JOSEPH BUTLER § 4, at 5 (W.E. Gladstone ed., 1897)).
2. For comprehensive discussion of research in this area, see generally CASs R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002); Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The Problem]; and Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The
UnwarrantedPessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis ofLaw, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1907 (2002).
3. For discussion of biases and heuristics and their potentially conflicting effects on
decisions about risk, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of
Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990). Emotion
can also affect judgment and decisionmaking. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J.
155 (2005); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgement? An
Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1
(2005).
4. For a general literature review of the potential problems caused by biases and
heuristics in all areas of law, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). Biases and heuristics can also complicate policymaking since policymakers must base response plans for things such as disaster relief
on general perceptions of risk as well as their actual probability. See Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Fear, Irrationality,and Risk Perception, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1047
(2004); Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policy Making, 69 Mo. L.
REV. 1039 (2004).
For general discussions of the legal implications of behavioralism, see BEHAVIORAL LAw AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); and Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human
Behavior, 97 N.w. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003).
5. Assessment of risk affects not only the basic determination of negligence, but
proximate cause, defenses, and the availability of punitive damages. Risk is also

2006]

BIASES AND HEURISTICS IN TORT LITIGATION

17

individuals role-playing as jurors in hypothetical negligence scenarios
exhibit consistent bias in evaluating the level of risk in certain activities. 6 Their knowledge that an event has occurred or that a bad result
has been reached biases them toward finding that the event or result
was more foreseeable than if viewed objectively and without prior
knowledge of the bad result.7 Studies also establish that individuals
overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks.8 Individuals
also have difficulty evaluating risks and benefits separately, making
risk-benefit decisions difficult. 9 Do these apparent deviations from rational decisionmaking significantly affect actual juror decisions about
risk in torts cases? Are jury verdicts consistently erroneous, warranting corrective measures? If the results of these laboratory studies can
be extrapolated to actual litigation, verdicts in negligence cases may
be overdeterring conduct which is reasonably safe. Jurors may also be
labeling negligent conduct as recklessness, thereby warranting punitive damages. Fundamental fairness is also implicated. If normative
tort rules are tainted by bias in their application, the credibility of the
litigation process as a cornerstone of dispute resolution is called into
question.
Relying on such empirical data, many commentators argue this
bias is happening consistently.1 0 They propose a variety of corrective

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

relevant to many issues affecting products liability and abnormally dangerous
activities as well.
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001)
(judges are affected as well as jurors); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries
Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 901
(1998); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the
Hindsight Bias, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 501 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors,
Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 131
(2001).
See, e.g., Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOL. 569, 570 (1988); Robert A. Caplan, Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 JAMA
1957, 1960 (1991); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 581 n.36 (1998) (collecting
references).
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 911.
See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-BenefitAnalysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
114 (2001); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, A Response]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence]; Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 2; Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523-32 (1998); Douglas A.
Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); Howard
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measures, from wholesale replacement of jurors in punitive-damage
cases with experts who will likely be less susceptible to bias,11 to
adoption of enterprise liability for product defect cases, 12 to elevated
burden of proof requirements and bifurcated trials in tort cases generally. 13 The arguments these scholars advance necessarily call into
question the viability of the behavioral theory of rational choice. 14 Rational-choice theory assumes that individuals act rationally and objectively to maximize their utility. If jurors do not act rationally, then
rational-choice theory is an imperfect behavioral foundation for legal
rules, especially negligence. The proposals also generally assume that
the laboratory studies documenting biased decisionmaking are sufficiently applicable to actual jury trials to support changing normative
rules and litigation procedures in all cases. They devote little attention to the validity of that assumption. Nor do they devote sufficient
consideration to the usefulness of existing precedent and practices to
correct for biases.15
The purpose of this Article is to challenge the necessity for such
broad changes in the tort litigation system. I argue the following:
(1) cognitive bias and heuristics may indeed introduce errors in result
in some cases; (2) both the breadth of any errors and their magnitude
may be relatively small and confined to a group of cases identifiable in
advance; and (3) existing case law and procedures offer potential to
protect against the level of bias that may actually be affecting juror
deliberations.
Part II of this Article reviews the empirical data and behavioral
theories supporting the argument that juror decisions are affected by
bias. Part III summarizes proposals for dramatically altering normative tort rules and procedures to address the problems of juror bias.
Part IV discusses why these proposals are overly broad and unnecesLatin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193 (1994); Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM
L. REV. 819 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Against Strict Liability]; Alan
Schwartz, Proposalsfor Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALE L.J. 353 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Proposals];Cass R. Sunstein, David
Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 237 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE
L.J. 2071 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000); Viscusi, supra note 6.
11.

SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 258.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10, at 1553-54.
Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1528.
See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
There is some discussion of categories of cases that deal with problems caused by
hindsight bias and procedural measures, which could be of use in controlling the
effect of such biases. See Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1528-29; Philip G. Peters,
Jr., HindsightBias and Tort Liability:Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 1277, 1306-11 (1999); Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 616-17.
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sary. Finally, Part V discusses the ability of existing case law to control bias and proposes solutions to accomplish that objective.
II.

ARGUMENTS THAT BIASES AND HEURISTICS AFFECT
JURORS: THEORY AND FACT

Normative legal rules serve many purposes. Among their most important functions, at least in tort law, should be to deter undesirable
conduct and promote desirable behavior.16 From an economic perspective, Coase observes that legal rules do not compel behavior but
establish the costs and consequences of actions and inactions.17 It is
but a short step from Coase's observation to its legal implementation
in tort law through Judge Learned Hand's formulation of a calculus of
risk.18 Hand's classic approach to negligence involves risk-benefit balancing: Is the burden of avoiding a harmful result less or greater than
the benefit from avoiding the result?19 Viewed through an economic
lens, Hand's deceptively straightforward negligence formula offers a
method to advance economically desirable goals. 2 0 Excessively dangerous conduct is deterred because the cost to pursue it is too great in
light of the benefits of avoidance. Negligence rules create an incentive
for more desirable, less dangerous conduct. Individuals will pursue
optimal levels of safety by balancing the risks, costs, and utility of
available alternative conduct. 2 1 In the aggregate, collective individual
actions will lead to socially optimal allocation of resources to the problem of accidents. Resources devoted to accident costs and accident22
prevention costs will be optimized, promoting wealth maximization.
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (4th ed. 1992); Guido Cala-

bresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1057 (1972).
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
In Judge Hand's words,
[T]he owner's duty... to provide against resulting injuries is a function
of three variables: (1) The probability that [the barge] will break away;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . ; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it
in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the
burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Id. at 173.
There are, of course, perspectives and objectives other than economic. See, e.g.,
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (philosoph-

ical perspective); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and
the Law of Fright:A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (feminist perspective);
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 539
(1972).
21. For a comprehensive discussion, see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).

22. See id.
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Risk-creating actors can order their conduct in reliance on the fair and
transparent application of these rules in every case, as administered
through the tort system.
A.

Rational Choice as a Flawed Behavioral Model

The optimal outcome described above rests on the assumption that
individuals, including jurors, make decisions rationally. The theoretical foundation for this view is rational-choice theory, derived from the
23
game theory work of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.
Rational-choice theory presumes that individuals always try to maximize their expected utility, primarily through acting rationally when
making decisions involving risks and benefits. 24 Rational-choice theory assumes that "objective criteria exist ... to differentiate rational
from irrational" behavior, that individual behavior is based on rational considerations, and that individuals acting on optimal information can and do rationally assess the risks involved in their choices
2
and seek to maximize utility by choosing from stable preferences. 5
Critics argue that rational-choice theory inadequately or incompletely explains human behavior. 26 Perhaps at best it explains some
behavior most of the time. In contrast to the predictions of rationalchoice theory, individuals do not always act to maximize their expected utility for a variety of reasons. They sometimes make suboptimal choices because of the impossibility of evaluating risks and risk23.

JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC

BEHAVIOR (1944). For additional discussions of game theory, also see Ian Ayers,
Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990) (book review); and
Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for
Prime Time?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1839 (1996) (book review).
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990) ("[Pleople are
rational maximizers of their satisfactions . . . in all of their activities . . . that

involve choice."). There is no single version of rational-choice theory. For discussion of this point, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1061-66 (2000); and Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1476. See
also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)

(explaining that all people "maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences
and accumulate an optimal amount of information").
25. Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer
Psychological Perspectives On Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 81, 100-01 (2000).

26. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a BehavioralLaw and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998); Jacoby, supra note 25; Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 24; see also Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional
Foundations of Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151 (2005) (suggesting that
rational-choice theory is too narrow because rationality involves value judgments
about what is a desirable outcome); Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat
Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Among Rationality, Markets, and
Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091 (2005) (discussing the relationship
between values and rational-choice theory).
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cost trade offs.27 Too much necessary information is either unknowable or too complex to assess with complete objectiveness. People
often act with subconscious motivation instead of complete rationality.
They sometimes evaluate information subjectively. Rational-choice
theory also neglects an important body of philosophical work on
probability theory. 28 Probability is an important component of risk,
dealing with the numerical likelihood or frequency of occurrence of an
adverse consequence. Since the seventeenth century, probability theory has recognized the duality of probability as containing both objective and subjective elements. 2 9 Professor Stephen Perry's discussion
of this duality is particularly useful. 30 One view of probability theorizes that it is an objective but unrealizable concept. Incomplete
knowledge and imperfect observation prevent determination of its
true value. 3 1 Probability, and accordingly risk, can only be approximated. Estimates are inherently subjective since they depend on the
32
observer's frame of reference, values, and intuitive reasoning.
Probability, though objective in theory, cannot be objectively
33
determined.
This "subjectivist" approach to probability is consistent with behavioral decision theories, which recognize the incompleteness of rational choice. Bounded rationality is one such approach. 34 It assumes
that human decisionmaking cannot be utility-maximizing as predicted
by rational-choice theory. People are willing to accept less than optimal utility so long as their choices come within an acceptable range of
solutions which approximate maximum utility. 35 The added information-cost necessary for optimal decisions, rationally arrived at, may
not be worth the marginal gain in utility. "Satisficing" 3 6 behaviorbehavior which approximates utility-maximization-is sufficient. So
27. Jacoby, supra note 25, at 107-08.
28. For an
29.

overview, see Roy WEATHERFORD,

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

OF

PROBABILITY THEORY (1982).
RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY 19-51 (2d ed. 1962); IAN
HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 122-23 (1975); David Lewis, A Subjec-

tivist's Guide to Objective Chance, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 63 (1986).
30. Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 20, at 321.

31. Id. at 325-29.
32. Id. at 325.
33. Id. at 323-24.
34. See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); HERBERT A. SIMON, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 408 (1982).
35. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1077-78.
36. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, in MOD-

ELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 261, 270-71 (1957); Herbert A. Simon, Satis-

ficing, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 243 (John Eatwell et
al. eds., 1987); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the
Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) (arguing that the costs of
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stated, bounded rationality, unlike rational choice, accounts for the
fact that making utility-maximizing decisions may be too complex for
37
human cognitive processes and too burdened by ambiguity. Tradeoffs such as risk versus cost, to be applied, may involve such complex
elements of objective information and subjective notions of individual
utility that optimal cost-benefit decisions are not pursued. Similar deviations are to be expected because of ambiguities in available information. Relevant comparisons may be incomplete, unavailable, or
even unknowable. As a result, rationally maximizing utility is not
possible or at least not worth the cost. While rational-choice theory
may be "descriptively and prescriptively accurate more often than any
other single theory of [human] behavior,"38 it is flawed and incomplete. One important consequence is that the application of normative
legal rules may not lead to the results assumed by rational-choice
theory.
B.

Empirical Evidence that Decisionmaking Involving Risk
is Affected by Biases and Heuristics

If behavioral theory recognizes lack of total rationality in decisionmaking, empirical studies support that position. Many studies contra39
The
dict assumptions underlying rational-choice theory.
groundbreaking empirical work in this area is Tversky & Kahneman's
40
study of individual decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty.
It demonstrated that individuals making decisions under ambiguous
conditions resort to heuristics41-mental short cuts-to reduce the
complexity of the decision to manageable proportions. While heurislead to decisionmaking errors
tics do reduce complexity, they can also
2
which are "severe and systematic."4
Two heuristics, the "representativeness heuristic" and the "availability heuristic," are particularly relevant to decisionmaking involving
risks. 4 3 When faced with uncertain, ambiguous choices, individuals

37.
38.
39.
40.

gathering and processing information lead most people to search for satisfactory
alternatives rather than optimal alternatives).
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1077-78.
Id. at 1072.
See supra note 2. For a general discussion of how decisionmaking is affected by
biases and heuristis, see Scorr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 109-88 (1993).
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974). For general discussion of the influence of Tversky and Kahneman's work, see David Laibson & Richard Zeckhauser, Amos Tversky and the Ascent of Behavioral Economics, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1998).

41. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 40, at 1124-26.
42. Id. at 1124.
43. For a more general discussion of the representativeness heuristic, see JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23-98 (Daniel Kahneman et al.

eds., 1982). For discussion of a related heuristic, the affective heuristic, see Paul
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may, sometimes subconsciously, utilize the representativeness heuristic. They are more likely to choose the options most representative of
previous, known patterns without questioning whether that previous
pattern has relevance in predicting future events. 44 This can overemphasize the relevance of a small number of prior representative
events, leading to error in estimating the likelihood of the occurrence
of a future event. Overestimation or underestimation of results, including the estimation of risk, can occur. Small risks, if known, can be
overestimated. If the risk is unknown, it may be underestimated or
ignored. 45 The representativeness heuristic is accurate in predicting
a future event only when previous, isolated occurrences are actually
representative of a future pattern. If they are not, but are merely random occurrences despite their apparent similarity to the current scenario, then use of the representativeness heuristic leads to erroneous
predictions.
The availability heuristic works similarly. The more available the
information about a possible future event, the more likely the available data will be used. Other, less available information, though more
predictive, will be used less often. 46 If all data-less available and
generally available-point to the same decision, inaccuracy is minimal. If less available information is more predictive and reliable, a
biased decision results. The same holds true for unimaginable consequences. If a consequence is unlikely to be imagined, it will be less
likely to be foreseen. 4 7 The availability heuristic can also lead either
to overestimation or underestimation depending on the available information used by the observer.
In addition to errors from heuristics, individuals have decisionmaking biases. They have "tendencies to make judgments or decisions
in ways that systematically depart from the economist's rational
choice expected utility model." 48 There are several documented biases
Slovic, What's Fear Got to Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 Mo.
L. REV. 971, 975-76 (2004).
44. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 43, at 84.
For a discussion of the relationship between the representativeness heuristic and
exclusions of character evidence in criminal trials under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 24, at 1086-87.
45. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 43, at 3, 8.
46. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207-08 (1973); see generally SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 142-79, 245-94 (2d

ed. 1991) (describing the general process of how people recognize information
about their surroundings and how that information is then organized and used).
47. See RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 18-23 (1980).
48. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1503.
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of particular interest in the torts area.4 9 "Hindsight bias" causes an
observer to overestimate the predictability of an event when the observer already knows what happened.50 "Outcome bias" is closely related. If an observer is aware of a bad result (for example, a serious
injury from a medical procedure), its occurrence is more likely to be
seen as predictable. 5 1 The "egocentric" or "optimistic bias" causes individuals to overestimate their own abilities, such as the ability to act
carefully to avoid injury or the ability to control events which are in
fact random occurrences beyond human control.52 Other risk-perception biases cause individuals to ignore small risks which are not otherwise emphasized and to prefer the elimination of uncertainty over its
reduction. 5 3 Stated differently, overprotection is preferable to reasonable protection.
Hindsight bias and outcome bias have been repeatedly examined
in the legal context. 54 Their cumulative influence arises from the fact
that knowledge of an outcome makes it difficult for an observer to set
aside that knowledge when asked to assess the factors which affect
the outcome. Subjects role-playing as jurors, given knowledge that
harm has been caused, attribute significantly higher probabilities to
the risk of harm occuring than subjects in the role of ex ante decisionmakers without the same prior knowledge.55 Small risks, as a
consequence, are overestimated, making events seem more foreseeable than objectively they are. The bias appears in groups as well, but
is perhaps less pronounced. 56 It also may affect the decisions of
judges. 57 "Debiasing 6fforts," at least those relying on providing ad49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

For a useful, brief description of various biases, see id. at 1503-06.
Fischhoff, supra note 8, at 288.
Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 570.
Neil D. Weinstein, UnrealisticOptimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980); see also Langevoort, supra note 4, at
1505-06 (discussing egocentric biases).
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1504.
See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessingthe Jury: Stereotypic and Hindsight
Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1112 (1990);
Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making,
Attitudes, and the HindsightBias, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989); Guthrie et
al., supra note 6; Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, JurorJudgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive
Damages, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1999); Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 6;
Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability
in Hindsight, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 101-02 (1995); Viscusi, supra note 6.
Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 54, at 99-102.
See Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 803 (discussing the presence of hindsight bias
in the decisions of a test group of judges).
Id. at 803; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to
Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005) (explaining
that judges and jurors are affected by same factors in making decisions and react
similarly).
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vance information to subjects about the existence of bias, appear to
have little effect.5s Outcome bias is a factor as well. Observers with
prior knowledge of the bad outcome of a decision, when asked to evaluate the quality of the decisionmaking process producing the outcome,
consistently rate it lower if they had prior knowledge of the bad result.59 Since jurors in torts cases know the plaintiff has suffered injuries as a result of a bad outcome, hindsight bias and outcome bias can
work together.60
Jurors do more than assess the foreseeability of harm in negligence
cases. They are also charged with balancing risk, cost, and utility to
determine whether particular conduct is tortious. Studies suggest
that subjectivity affects the balancing process. 6 1 Juror assessment of
both risks and benefits may be affected by either positive or negative
perceptions associated with those risks and benefits. Individuals
seem less concerned with the level of risk when they perceive benefits
associated with the risk.62 Individuals appear to accept higher levels
of risk if the risk is voluntarily encountered than if it is forced on
them. 63 Where there is the ability to totally eliminate risk as compared to merely reducing it, elimination is preferred to reduction even
if the objective level of reduction-for example, twenty percent-is the
same. 6 4 Risk and benefit are not separable concepts to most observers. They appear to be combined into one subjective, overall determination affected by a "moral outlook in which human life is not viewed
as properly subject to instrumentalist [balancing] against.., competing interests." 6 5 Rather, "empirical evidence suggests that juries are
simply unable or unwilling to approach the informal step of the riskutility analysis in the tidy, [objective] manner required by economic
theory.66
Other studies involving risk-creating actors reach the same general conclusions as the juror studies. The decisionmaking of profes58. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 825; Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1527.
59. See Baron & Hershey, supranote 7, at 571-72; LaBine & LaBine, supra note 6, at
507-08; D. Jordan Lowe & Phillip M.J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on
Juror'sEvaluation of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION Sci. 401, 408-11 (1996).
60. Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 570.
61. Viscusi, supra note 6, at 115; see also Jon Cohen, Rethinking a Vaccine's Risk, 293
Sci. 1576 (2001) (noting that overestimation of small risk of dangerous bowel obstruction in use of vaccine to prevent rotavirus infections, which kill 800,000 children worldwide each year, led to manufacturer's decision to take off the market a
vaccine with significant health benefits in preventing rotavirus).
62. See generally Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, 208 Sci.
1114 (1980); Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165 Sci.
1232 (1969).
63. Starr, supra note 62, at 1233-38.
64. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1504.
65. Kysar, supra note 10, at 1738.
66. Id. at 1737.
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sionals generally-as engineers, project managers, physicians,
designers, and accountants-is also affected by the same biases. 6 7
Decisions about the risk of failure of a product or process may be
based on individual knowledge that failure has not occurred in the
past, instead of reliance on more comprehensive baseline data which
predicts a higher risk of failure.68 Such common mental error has
been repeatedly observed in accidents involving complex systems failures attributable to judgment errors. 69 Individuals also overestimate
their own ability to perform an action safely and at the same time
underestimate the risks associated with the activity. This egocentric
bias leads to the erroneous belief that individual ability and competence can control risks that are in fact beyond human control. 70
Knowledge that these biases can affect decisions is so sufficiently
widespread that many organizations have formal procedures in place
7
to avoid them. 1
Even with controls in place, organizational culture can lead to erroneous risk assessments. Substantial work has been done on the role
of cultural and institutional bias, as opposed to work on individual,
psychological bias, which points to the conclusion that organizational
culture can also affect the rationality and objectivity of decisions about
risk.72 The connection between organizational culture and behavior of
67. See Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 783 n.26 (collecting references).
68. For discussion of this effect and how investment decisions by economists and
other financial professionals were catastrophically affected, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MAN-

(2001).
69. See generally JAMES R. CHILES, INVITING DISASTER: LESSONS FROM THE EDGE OF
AGEMENT

TECHNOLOGY (2001) (discussing heuristics and engineering safety decisions);
CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES

(1984) (complex high-risk technology systems can suffer from failures of two or
more parts that interact in a way designers did not expect, and such unexpected
interactions will inevitably lead to accidents).
70. For general discussions, see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of
Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998); and Weinstein,
supra note 52.
71. For a comprehensive discussion of the formal safety procedures used by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to reduce the risks of
launching and flying space shuttles, and the tragic failure of those procedures

72.

due to biased judgments, see DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996).
Id. at 399-405; see also MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY ACCORDING TO THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985) (discussing the impact of cultural and social factors on
risk perception and acceptability); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND
CULTURE (1982) (arguing that public perception of acceptable risks to the environment is a function of social organizations and group constructs); SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE (1986); James F. Short, Jr., The

Social Fabricat Risk: Toward the Social Transformationof Risk Analysis, 49 AM.
Soc. REV. 711 (1984) (discussing the interplay between social factors and risk
analysis).
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individuals within the organization suggests two effects at work.
First, decisions which objective observers outside an organization
would label as questionable or even excessively dangerous may be rationalized as acceptable within the organization. Internal institutional norms and practices become of greater significance than
generally accepted external societal and professional norms in guiding
decisions. 7 3 Second, an institutional environment often reflects
strong competitive pressures, budget constraints, and project deadlines which influence individual actions. 74 These "environmental" facin place to
tors operate even though the organization has procedures
75
prevent such forces from adversely affecting decisions.
Studies in both large and small organizations have found that a
6
common factor in accidents is "failure[ ] of foresight."7 Events which
should have alerted a rational observer to the risk of failure were either ignored, overlooked, explained away, or interpreted inconsis77
tently with other information which indicated excessive risk.
Institutional culture may contribute to the underestimation of risk,
producing results similar to individuals affected by heuristics and biases. Diane Vaughan, in an insightful work, has documented in great
detail how the institutional culture of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) contributed to the loss of the space
shuttle Challenger in 1986.78 Vaughan's major point is that institutional culture can lead to "normalization of deviance" in organizations. 79 Decisions which would be considered dangerous outside an
organization are "normalized" inside it because of various institutional pressures. Institutional culture may create "[o]perational
danger,
forces that shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential
s0
resulting in mistakes with harmful human consequences."
C.

The Implications of Risk Misperception

The implications of risk misperception are dramatically different
depending on whether the problem is viewed primarily as underestimation or overestimation of risk. In fact, both kinds of misperceptions
are at work. As a general proposition, there is substantial evidence
that individuals, either when making decisions about risk or acting as
jurors and deciding whether the risks others have taken are accept73.

VAUGHAN, supra note 71, at 406-07.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 415-16.
76.

BARRY A. TURNER, MAN-MADE DISASTERS 161 (1978).

77. See id. at 151.
78. VAUGHAN, supra note 71.

79. Id. at 409.
80. Id.
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able, do not always act rationally.81 This contradicts the behavioral
assumptions of rational-choice theory, raising questions as to its ability to predict responses to legal rules. Regardless of whether individuals overestimate or underestimate risk, important societal and legal
implications follow. To the extent that individuals and even organizations consistently underestimate risks of their conduct, they impose
greater risks on society. Only a very small percentage of accidents
end up in litigation and full damages may not be awarded in all
cases.8 2 Even assuming general societal knowledge of risk levels
transmitted through higher insurance rates and the deterrence signals from accidents which are litigated, widespread underestimation
of risk may be causing a greater number of accidents than rationalchoice theory predicts. The level of tortious conduct in society may be
excessively high and beyond the ability of the legal system to control
through the usual deterrence mechanisms operating through negli83
gence rules.
The societal problem of potentially excessive accidents has been
largely unaddressed by scholars more concerned with studies that jurors may be overestimating risk. If jurors consistently overestimate
the foreseeability of small risks, non-tortious conduct may be labeled
as negligence. Jurors may be imposing de facto strict liability even
though they are instructed on the basis of de jure negligence principles. At the other end of the fault continuum, ordinary negligence
may be transmuted into recklessness or wantonness. Punitive damages may be assessed for negligent conduct. Total damages, compensatory and punitive, may be higher than justified by the facts. Jurors
may also be incapable of making objectively "correct" risks-cost-utility
tradeoffs necessary in negligence law. Excessively costly alternatives
may be required because of overweighting of safety interest and overemphasis on risks.
These deviations from objective assessment of risk because of juror
bias also may have major consequences. Verdicts in negligence cases
may cause misallocations of resources spent on safety and accident
costs. Tort verdicts may be directing more than optimal resources to
the problems of accidents, raising insurance costs accordingly. The
tort goal of wealth maximization is frustrated since optimal deterrence cannot be achieved because of biased jury verdicts. The funda81. It is important to note, as have others, that not acting rationally should not be
equated with acting irrationally. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE
SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1506.

82. See J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87
COLUM.L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1987) (book review).
83. See id.; see also Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10 (arguing that
many corporations, through advertising, manipulate consumer perceptions of
risk, making consumers believe products are safer than they actually are, resulting in less spending by manufacturers on product safety).

BIASES AND HEURISTICS IN TORT LITIGATION

2006]

29

mental fairness of the tort process is also at issue. Individuals and
organizations order their conduct to some extent on the effect of normative legal rules. If those rules are affected by biased judgment regarding their applications, then the rules operate differently than
commonly assumed. The system may be unfair because results are
unpredictable. While it has been observed that litigants and even
judges may be generally unaware and therefore little concerned about
the problem of fairness arising from juror bias,84 awareness of the
fairness issue may increase as knowledge of the bias problem is more
generally known. The effect of juror bias directly contradicts the assumption-based partly on rational-choice theory, partly on social
norms-that the legal system is fair, impartial, and objective. Juror
decisionmaking tainted even by unconscious bias leading to unpredictable and unfair results is reason for concern.
The theoretical shortcomings of rational-choice theory and the substantial evidence of biased decisionmaking by jurors and risk-creating
actors are sufficiently compelling to many to justify corrective measures. Part III of this Article will explore proposals for change.
III.

PROPOSALS TO COUNTERACT THE INFLUENCE OF
BIASES AND HEURISTICS

The scholarly conversation about the potential shortcomings of rational-choice theory and the effects of biases and heuristics on the legal systems is now well into its second decade.8 5 From the beginning,
there has been disagreement over whether jurors consistently overestimate or underestimate risk because behavioral studies support both
conclusions. Much of the initial work in the torts area focused on the
ability of consumers to respond rationally to product warnings, and
whether psychological studies suggested that consumers overestimate
or underestimate product risk in light of the warning information provided by manufacturers.8 6 Howard Latin, in an early influential article, contended that a combination of biases and heuristics in the
aggregate caused underestimation of risk.8 7 By his analysis, consumers are usually unaware of many product risks. When given information on how to reduce such risks, product users may ignore it. They
84. See Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 601.
85. For a literature review, see Langevoort, supra note 4, at 1529-40.
86. Latin, supra note 10; Howard A. Latin, Problem-SolvingBehavior and Theories of
Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 677 (1985); Robert A. Prentice & Mark E.
Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution": Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251 (1991); Schwartz,
Against Strict Liability, supra note 10; Schwartz, Proposals, supra note 10; W.
Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of
Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625 (1996).

87. Latin, supra note 10, at 1240-41.
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prefer risk elimination8S instead of risk reduction. They are also confident in their ability to use products safely because of the operation of
the egocentric bias.89 These factors collectively, Latin argued, undermine the rational-actor assumptions underlying comment j to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A90 and support the need for
greater manufacturer liability to offset consumer inability to accurately perceive product risks, even when warned. 9 1
Other scholars reach a different conclusion from the behavioral research, arguing that consumers overestimate product risks. 92 In their
view, the biases and heuristics which lead to risk overestimations are
most likely to influence consumer behavior. 9 3 As a consequence, consumers are excessively deterred from using products which are in fact
reasonably safe, and manufacturers must expend more than optimal
resources to market their products. Liability rules that require even
more deterrence, such as a true strict-liability requirement for product
warnings and designs, would only strengthen an already undesired
effect. Viscusi's solution to this problem would be a uniform national
product warning system to offset and counterbalance the inability of
consumers to assess risks rationally. 94 Alan Schwartz agreed with
Viscusi that increased liability is not warranted, but on a different
ground. He was not convinced the behavioral research supported either risk overestimation or underestimation 95 and, in light of that uncertainty, did not believe a case could be made for strict liability based
on the empirical data alone.
Recent work has gone far beyond the scope of this earlier work by
proposing more specific remedies for the problems raised by the behavioral research. 9 6 While the proposals vary widely, most share
common elements. For the most part, they assume the major problem
is overestimation of risk leading to excessive deterrence and not un88. Id. at 1239.
89. People are often "unduly optimistic about their ability to avoid.., hazards" and
consequently do not respond adequately to product warnings. Id. at 1243. See
also Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 86, at 294-95 (arguing that people tend
to be overconfident in their own judgment and in their ability to avoid accidents
with the products they use).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965) (providing that where an
adequate "warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read
and heeded").
91. Latin, supra note 10, at 1240-41.
92. See generally Schwartz, Against Strict Liability, supra note 10; Viscusi, supra
note 86.
93. Viscusi, supra note 86, at 645-46.
94. Id. at 666.
95. Schwartz, Against Strict Liability, supra note 10, at 832-35.
96. See articles cited supra note 10.
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derestimation. 97 This overestimation, documented by behavioral research, is assumed to affect decisions of jurors in actual litigation.
The biases are assumed to affect all cases and do not operate selectively.98 Conventional de-biasing efforts which might be employed by
courts to counterbalance the effect of biases and heuristics are not effective, 99 requiring different approaches.
One group of proposals concentrates on restricting juror discretion
in evaluating risks to minimize the potentially harmful effect of bias
on juror decisionmaking. Cass Sunstein and his colleagues have addressed this issue with a comprehensive review of the behavioral research and a sweeping recommendation for change. 100 Based on
empirical research on the effect of juror bias, especially in products
liability cases involving punitive damages, 10 1 they conclude that juries often behave as retributionist bodies insufficiently concerned with
the proper amount of deterrence imposed by these verdicts.10 2 The
solution proposed is to dramatically circumscribe or even eliminate
the jury's role, especially in determining punitive damages awards.
Judges would be given a far greater role, and experts-instead of juries-would assess damages.103 Juries could even be replaced by administrative tribunals, converting at least a portion of the torts
litigation process into a worker's compensation analogue with strong
04
elements of paternalism.1
Other discussions have focused on whether the litigation process
itself could be modified to reduce the effects of bias. Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler have proposed different, less sweeping remedies which fit
more comfortably within the existing torts litigation process. 10 5 They
97. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 6; Jolls et
al., supra note 10, at 1527.
98. Most of the discussion about the effect of biases and heuristics has concerned
these individual effects in sequential fashion. There are only a few discussions of
their potentially cumulative or offsetting effects. See Rachlinski, supra note 7, at
594; Schwartz, Against Strict Liability, supra note 10, at 832-33.
99. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 6, at 917; Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 54, at
97-98.
100. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2.
101. A major theme of the work is that jury punitive damages awards are unpredictable (both high and low) because of human cognition error. Id. at viii.
102. See id. at 39. For a discussion of this aspect of the work, see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages:Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 382-84
(2003) (book review).
103. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 242, 258; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985) (arguing that the tort system
should be replaced by regulatory and insurance regimes since its costs outweigh
benefits).
104. See Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1997); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 229-30
(1998) (arguing that paternalistic norms can be efficient).
105. Jolls et al., supra note 10.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:15

support bifurcation of trials to separate the issue of liability from damages 10 6 and to keep knowledge of bad results from jurors,10 7 as well as
elevating the burden of proof to a clear-and-convincing standard to reduce the effect of hindsight bias.108 Others have argued more generally for decreasing the influence of juries in tort cases.' 0 9 Hastie and
Viscusi state that "[the present structure [with juries vested with
large discretion to ultimately decide tort litigation] will not simply
make random errors but will in fact impose a systematic bias by levying excessive penalties on companies for whom the accident lottery
has turned out unfavorably."'" 0 The problem of "massive hindsight""' bias in jurors calls for shifting from a jury-centered litigation
113
system to a "non-tort-centric" 112 approach to risk management.
Finally, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich point out that there
may be as many problems with limiting the role of jurors and increasing the authority of judges as there are with juries alone. 114 Judges
decide about as many cases as juries, as well as deal with questions of
admissibility of evidence and qualification of experts. If biases affect
judges to the same extent they affect jurors, then increasing the power
of judges at the expense of jurors may accomplish little.115 These
scholars' own empirical studies suggest just that: Judges as well as
jurors are affected by bias. 116 In fact, juries may be less affected than
judges since group decisions may be less susceptible to the effects of
bias than individual decisions."17 Making judges, or even experts, the
chief decisionmakers, as Sunstein proposes, 118 may not be good policy.
Use of substantive rules instead of procedural devices as a means
of counteracting the effects of heuristics and biases has also been proposed."19 Hanson and Kysar argue that enterprise liability-strict liability which imposes all external costs caused by the entity on the
enterprise-should become the liability standard in products liability
cases. 120 Unlike others, 1 2 1 they argue that seller manipulation of consumer product safety perceptions leads to greater risk, which would
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1527-29.
Id.
Id. at 1529-32
See, e.g., Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 6.
Id. at 916-17.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 827.
Id. at 781, 827.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 827.

118. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 242, 258.

119. See Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10; Kysar, supra note 10.
120. Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10, at 1553-62. For earlier development of the same thesis, see Stephen P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the
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best be deterred by enterprise liability.122 As such, they see the need
for greater deterrence, not less. 123 Using largely the same body of behavioral research as other scholars, they are uncertain whether the
studies suggest risk is overestimated or underestimated. 1 24 For their
purposes the answer awaits further research, and in any event, is
largely irrelevant. Rather, they assert that manufacturers and marketers know individuals misperceive risk. These groups are driven by
competitive pressure to actively manipulate consumer risk perception
in a way advantageous to product marketers; 12 5 advertising is the vehicle to accomplish this result. Consumers are regularly persuaded
that products are safer than they actually are through marketing
techniques which emphasize safety and downplay risks.12 6 Hanson
and Kysar argue that products are in fact more dangerous on average
than consumers expect them to be. Marketing techniques in essence
"overload" other more objective messages about product risks and promote overuse of dangerous products.12 7 To correct for this false perception of safety, manufacturers should be held to enterprise-liability
standards, thereby increasing costs to manufacturers and injecting
additional deterrence into the product marketplace, which increases
28
product safety.1
Other commentators propose a different substantive change. 12 9
Again relying on behavioral research, Kysar argues that jurors do not
make rational, objective risk-cost tradeoffs in tort cases.1 3 0 Because of
this, the consumer-expectations test for defects, which imposes liability in situations where a product is more dangerous than a reasonable
consumer expects it to be, should assume a greater role in products
liability litigation than currently is the case. 13 1 The Restatement
(Third)of Torts: Products Liability relies on risk-utility balancing as
the preferred defect test, with an implicit assumption that jurors can
effectively perform the balance.1 3 2 Kysar argues risk-utility balanc-

130.
131.

Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683,
706-10 (1993).
See generally SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Jolls et al., supra note 10; Prentice &
Roszkowski, supra note 86; Viscusi, supra note 86.
Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10, at 1552-55. For further development of this argument, see Hanson & Kysar, A Response, supra note 10.
Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 10, at 1554-55.
Id. at 1427.
Id.
Id. at 1553.
Id.
Id.
See Kysar, supra note 10 (writing separately from Hanson to advance this
change); see also Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of
Cost Justification,56 VAND. L. REV. 653 (2003) (proposing a similar change).
Kysar, supra note 10, at 1735-40.
Id. at 1741-42.

132.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1997).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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ing is beyond the grasp of the typical juror. Preferential use of the
consumer-expectations test would lessen the influence of biases and
heuristics, which affect juror decisions on whether a product's risks
133
outweigh its benefits.
Mark Geistfeld, relying little on behavioral research, develops a corollary to Kysar's argument that juries are incapable of making the
risk-cost-utility balances contemplated by economic theory.134
Geistfeld argues that overestimation of risk levels is justifiable, especially when the actual level of risk is unknown, to ensure an appropriate level of safety.13 5 This overweighing of safety interests will not
lead to the optimal level of safety assumed to be achieved by objective
risk-utility balancing.136 The justification for this approach is that individuals prefer security, with its heightened safety emphasis, over
liberty interests. The liberty interest emphasizes freedom to act and
to pursue risk-creating conduct in exchange for greater wealth and
utility. For small risks with only slight benefit, Geistfeld argues that
it is justifiable to prefer security over liberty. Individuals should not
have to be exposed to risks of serious harm or death even if optimal
deterrence would point to a different result. 137 Like others, he also
advocates more deterrence, but primarily for nonconsensual risks involving serious injury or death. This would be accomplished by explicitly overweighing by a factor of two, the weight given to risk in the
traditional Hand calculus-of-risk equation. 138 In this way, safety
would be preferred over risk-creating activity. Its effect would be the
same as if jurors consistently overestimated small risks because of biases and heuristics. Geistfeld devotes little attention to how his proposal might be affected by behavioral research on juror bias in
assessing risk. He does offer the observation that his proposal is consistent with how individual jurors actually assess risk, 13 9 but offers no
discussion on whether his proposal, coupled with the possibility of juror bias, could produce even greater levels of safety than desired.
While there has been counsel for caution and moderation, 140 the
dominant theme in these proposals is for corrective measures which
would affect virtually all tort litigation involving evaluation of risk,
either alone or in combination with cost and utility. Whether such
broad ranging proposals are justified is evaluated below in Part IV.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Kysar, supra note 10, at 1735.
Geistfeld, supra note 10.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 143-45; see also supra note 19.
Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 167.
Peters, supra note 15, at 1312; Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 625.
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IV. REASONS FOR A CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY BIASES AND HEURISTICS
IN TORTS LITIGATION
The proposals discussed above rely on two implicit assumptions.
First, the errors introduced by biases and heuristics are of sufficient
magnitude and scope to affect all litigation results. Second, the results of laboratory studies documenting the existence of these biases
and heuristics and their effects are generally applicable to actual litigation. Wholly apart from the doctrinal criticisms that have addressed the substantive merits of these proposals, 14 1 and as will be
developed in this Part, these assumptions are questionable. Some errors in litigation results attributable to biases and heuristics may exist; those errors may affect outcomes in a relatively small percentage
of cases. The hindsight bias appears to operate selectively and not in
every case. In addition, where it does operate, the size of the effect is
probably small, and not enough to always skew results. Finally, the
behavioral studies which are the foundations of these proposals are
not contextual. They take into consideration neither the realities of
the adversarial process nor the ability of existing rules and procedures
to control bias-induced errors.
A.

The Scope and Magnitude of the Effects of Biases and
Heuristics

Studies measuring the degree to which individuals overestimate
risks because of biases and heuristics indicate that the overestimations are relatively small142 and may affect only a small percentage of
individuals estimating risk levels. 14 3 Errors of this magnitude do not
141. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-RelatedRisk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of EnterpriseLiability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMs U. L.
REV. 213, 216 (2000) (arguing that enterprise liability is flawed because it does
not permit consideration of a product user's ability to avoid injuries); Robert A.
Hillman, The Limits of BehavioralDecision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of
LiquidatedDamages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 718 (2000) (implying that the empirical evidence is not yet sufficiently clear to justify it as a basis for new legal
rules); Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 1742 (stating that empirical studies neglect
effect of institutional context of litigation and ability of existing constraints to
control problem of biases); Mitchell, supra note 2, at 1911-12 (examining how the
empirical evidence does not justify changing substantive rules); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, BehavioralEconomics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551
(1998) (explaining that rational choice, even though it does not completely explain human behavior, remains the most comprehensive theory of human behavior and an adequate basis for legal rules).
142. On average the overestimations are about fifteen percent.
143. Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 606; see also Fischhoff, supra note 8, at 289-90 (noting that in studies not involving legal scenarios, results affected by biases ranged
from six percent to forty percent); cf Mitchell, supra note 2, at 1965 (explaining
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occur in every case, 144 and even if they did, are not always of significant magnitude to affect jury verdicts. The actual effect may instead
be limited to a relatively small portion of the universe of tort verdicts.
In a theoretically perfect negligence model where the other calculusof-risk variables such as cost, feasibility of alternatives, and severity
of harm and utility145 could be held constant while only foreseeability
of harm varied, it would be possible to assess the quantitative effects
of errors attributable to biases and heuristics. Assuming this could be
done-and also assuming that other variables affecting negligence are
at a level that would justify holding a defendant negligent if the risk of
harm, objectively assessed, is significant but not if the risk is smallthere surely would be an effect of bias, but not in all cases. If foreseeability of harm, even without the overestimations attributable to hindsight bias, is sufficiently great to justify liability, risk overestimation
would not produce additional liability because a jury would find negligence in any event. There probably are a relatively small group of
cases where the bias might tip otherwise merely negligent conduct
into recklessness, leading to a punitive damages award.14 6 This is one
group of cases that need a mechanism to control the effects of biases
and heuristics. In a second situation, the foreseeability of harm may
be so small that even a fifteen percent overestimation of risk by some,
but not all jurors, will still not result in a finding of negligence. In a
third group of cases, the actual level of risk is sufficient but not necessarily conclusive on the issue of negligence. Here, bias may affect results because hindsight bias could tip jurors toward finding liability
when, in its absence, conduct might not be labeled as tortious.
In the real world, quantitative effects usually do not operate in
such orderly fashion. The above examples assume the other variables
in the negligence calculus-of-risk equation are in equipoise, when in
fact they rarely are. In a broad range of cases, foreseeability of harm
may be of relatively minor importance in determining negligence. The
relatively small quantitative effect of risk overestimation, when compared with the potentially greater effect of other variables in the determination of negligence, suggests caution in generalizing the effect
that in surveys of general public, those who might make a different decision because of hindsight bias range from seven percent to twenty-seven percent).
144. Being charitable with the numbers in note 143, if only one in five jurors would
make a different decision because of hindsight bias and the average magnitude of
risk overestimation is on average about twenty percent, in a typical twelve person jury panel the decision of only two members might be affected, and then only
to a minor degree. These numbers suggest that many, if not most cases, would
not be affected.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 289, 291-293 (1965).
146. But see SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight,and
Punitive Damages Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for Change, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 889-90 (1999).
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of bias on negligence verdicts. Cost and feasibility of alternative conduct are variables not affected by overestimation of risk, and they
often far outweigh the effect of foreseeability of harm in determining
14 7
liability. Costs to pursue a safer alternative may be either so great
8
or reasonable enough14 that the relatively small effect of hindsight
bias may be of no consequence. Where no feasible alternative to the
risk creating conduct exists, 149 risk overestimation of jurors will not
yield a negligence finding. In addition, in violation-of-statute cases
where the elements of negligence per se are met, 150 liability will result, regardless of the effect of hindsight bias. Violation of customary
practice also would probably outweigh the effect of any bias.
B.

Context Considered: The Difference Between Laboratory
Studies and Litigation

Lack of context for behavioral studies is an additional reason for
caution in assuming their general applicability to the litigation process.151 These studies generally do not take into account the possibility that plaintiffs as well as defendants may be at fault. Since
comparative fault is the rule in most states15 2 and arises in a significant percentage of cases, this leaves a major gap in the data. For example, assume a situation where the plaintiff is aware of the danger
in the design of the defendant's product and nevertheless proceeds to
use the product in an unreasonable way and is injured. Both the potential negligence of the defendant in designing the product 5 3 and
147. For a general discussion of proof of feasible alternative, see Wilson v. PiperAircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). See also Rypkema v. Time Mfg. Co., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that plaintiff must prove the existence of a
feasible alternative).
148. Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1998) (finding that three other
companies already used alternative); McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 985 P.2d
804 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (design change already under way and was later
incorporated).
149. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2 cmt. b (1997) (stating, in
part, that the existence of a "reasonable alternative design is the predominant,
yet not exclusive, method for establishing defective design"); see also Wilson, 577
P.2d 1322 (holding that to meet burden, plaintiff must establish not only that
alternative design is technically feasible but practicable, which involves concrete
consideration of cost and the impact on the overall utility of the product).
150. Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288B (1965).

151. Issacharoff, supra note 26, at 1743; Mitchell, supra note 2, at 1957-59; Sharkey,
supra note 102, at 404.
152. As of this writing, only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia retain contributory negligence as a defense. See DAVID G.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 793 n.10 (2005).
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1997) (providing that
the reasonableness of the defendant's action in designing the product is the test
for liability).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:15

the potential negligence of the plaintiff in using it are at issue. Would
biases and heuristics work directionally in the same way where the
plaintiff is at fault compared to a scenario where the plaintiff is free
from fault? Presumably not. Hindsight bias may cause jurors to overestimate the risks in the defendant's design process or the design itself. There is no reason to assume that the same jurors would not
similarly overestimate the risks of plaintiff's conduct.15 4 If bias affects assessment of both the defendant's and plaintiffs risks, then
both may be overestimated. The result in a comparative-fault jurisdiction would be greater fault by the plaintiff, possibly preventing any
recovery or further reducing the defendant's share of the liability and
damages.1 5 5 In comparative-fault jurisdictions and with a plaintiff
who is partially at fault, hindsight bias could produce an effect opposite the result if the plaintiff were free of fault. Additional complica56
tions may occur with multiple claimants and multiple defendants.1
The behavioral studies also do not account for the impact of the
adversarial process itself.157 It is one thing to read a hypothetical fact
situation and respond to questions when some variables are changed.
A quite different dynamic is at play where the same basic facts are
presented by testimony of witnesses in the formal structure of a judicial proceeding with lawyers present and a judge presiding. Presumably, lawyers can make a difference; skilled advocates may have a
158
greater impact on the outcome of a case than bias errors of jurors.
154. On the same point, see Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 594-95. The plaintiffs own
fault, to the extent attributable to overconfidence from the egocentric bias, should
be recognized by the jury and reflected in its determination of the percentage of
the plaintiffs liability for his own damages.
155. Rachlinski observes that juror biases towards plaintiffs and defendants could be
offsetting, producing no effect on overall liability. Id. This may hold some truth
in some situations. More likely, plaintiffs damages will be reduced because of his
or her own relative fault.
156. There is no behavioral research on this point. For one approach to handling multiple plaintiffs and defendants, insolvency of one of the defendants, contribution
and set-offs, see UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT §§ 2, 3, 6, 12 U.L.A. 33 (Supp.
1981).
157. For general discussions of the interaction of juror bias and the litigation process,
see NEIL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURIES THINK AND TALK ABoUT Acci-

DENTS (2000); Mark R. Kosieradzki, Voir Dire in the Age of JurorBias, TRIAL, Oct.
2001, at 37, 65; and Mark Mandell, Overcoming JurorBias: Is There an Answer,
TRIAL, July 2000, at 28, 28. For reviews of the literature on whether results of
mock juror studies accurately reflect actual juror behaviors, see Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of Consequentialityin
Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 443 (2005); and Robert J. MacCoun, ComparingLegal Factfinders:Real and Mock, Amateur and Professional,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511 (2005).
158. For discussions of tactics attorneys can use during voir dire and trial to mitigate
various juror biases, see Kosieradzki, supra note 157, at 65-69; and Mandell,
supra note 157, at 28-29. See also Merric Joe Stallard & Debra L. Worthington,
Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 Hum.
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So far, empirical studies leave this issue largely unaddressed.159 Behavioral studies also do not take into consideration the broad range of
constraints already in place in the legal system to control aberrant
jury results. In the punitive damages area, for example, the Supreme
Court 160 and many state courts 16 1 have imposed a number of safeguards, including elevation of the burden of proof,162 greater scrutiny
of jury verdicts within strict parameters by both trial and appellate
courts, 16 3 and guidelines for the ratio of the size of the punitive damages award to the trustee of the compensatory award.164 Judicial response to excessive punitive damages awards may be a useful model
for dealing with the potential problems of biases and heuristics
generally.165

Errors introduced by biases and heuristics may be a problem in
some cases. Their effect should be recognized and dealt with appropriately. But behavioral studies do not as of yet support the much
broader conclusion that biases operate consistently in every case or
even to a significant degree in cases where they may be present. At
this point, many of the proposals designed to address the bias problem
BEHAV. 671, 675 (1998) (defense counsel appeal during closing to avoid hindsight
bias and not second-guess reduced effect of hindsight bias by more than seventy
percent).
159. For a review on what has been done, see Lowe & Reckers, supra note 59, at 403.
160. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see also Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (imposing safeguards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (same); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Heslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991) (same); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Video Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 527 (1989) (same).
161. For a representative state's decision, see Gamble v. Stephenson, 406 S.E.2d 350
(S.C. 1991), which establishes an eight-factor test to determine whether a trial
court must reduce a given punitive damages award to ensure due process. The
factors are "(1) defendant's degree of culpability; (2) duration of the conduct; (3)
defendants' awareness of concealment; (4) existence of similar or past conduct; (5)
likelihood the award will deter like conduct; (6) whether the award is reasonably
related to the harm likely to result from such conduct; (7) defendant's ability to
pay;" and (8) other appropriate factors. Id. at 354. See also Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986) (listing factors). Review in federal
court is treated in Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc. v. Crane National Vendors,
Inc., 99 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 1996). Assuming no constitutional challenge, whether
the amount of the jury verdict meets state law limits is determined by the district
court under federal procedural standards. The jury's finding of the amount of
punitive damages is given a less deferential review than other issues. Also, the
trial judge has a participating role in determining whether the punitive damages
award will result in a miscarriage ofjustice. See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT
L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 587-92 (2d Ed. 1997).

162.
163.
164.
165.

Pacific Mutual, 499 U.S. at 20.
See id. at 22; Gamble, 406 S.E.2d at 354.
See Pacific Mutual, 499 U.S. at 1, 21, 23.
Securities fraud cases are another example of close judicial scrutiny of possibly
erroneous jury verdicts. For a discussion of this trend, see infra notes 222-33
and accompanying text.
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and which would dramatically change the basic tort systems, are not
warranted. Where problems may exist, narrower remedies strategically employed by judges in appropriate cases offer a better approach.
These potential remedies will be explored in the next Part of this
Article.
V.

A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS CAUSED
BY BIASES AND HEURISTICS IN TORT LITIGATION

Behavioral studies have established beyond doubt that decisionmaking on risk is affected by biases and heuristics.166 Juror deliberations on risk may be affected as well.167 This would mean that both
juror assessment of the magnitude of risk and decisions on risk-costutility balancing could be impacted. Even so, errors attributable to
biases and heuristics may be consistently present only in a particular
cluster of tort cases. Beyond this recurring pattern the effects of bias
are unclear and must await more studies. Too many complexities, including the relative fault of plaintiffs and defendants,1 68 the effects of
potentially offsetting biases, 16 9 the relatively small magnitude of the
biases' 70 and other factors, like the effect of lawyers on the outcome of
litigation,171 cumulatively weigh against concluding that juror bias
consistently affects outcomes of all cases. Even if juror determinations of risk are affected in a relatively small group of cases, corrective
measures are warranted. Growing awareness of the potential for unfair results and the potential for verdicts producing mistaken deterrence signals are sufficient reasons for remedies. This Part argues,
first, that the types of cases where juror bias is most likely to affect
results in a predictable way are identifiable in advance; and second,
that courts have developed a variety of approaches to the problems of
misperception generally that can be applied to risk misperceptions
caused by biases and heuristics. A case-by-case approach to the problem is preferable to broader solutions which could have indiscriminate
and even harmful effects in cases where the possible effect of juror
bias is unclear.
A.

Areas of Tort Litigation Most Likely Affected

Cases where bias and heuristics are likely to have some impact are
identifiable. They involve relatively small to moderate risk, 172 ab166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra Part II.
authorities cited supra note 54.
supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
supra note 154.
supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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sence of significant contributory fault by the plaintiff,173 no violations
of custom or statute,a7 4 minimal cost of alternative conduct,175 and
significant harm.' 7 6 Behavioral studies establish that both hindsight
bias177 and outcome bias 178 operate here and may lead to consistent
overestimation of risks by jurors.179 This risk overestimation coupled
with the operation of outcome bias-which suggests that a bad result,
a serious injury, comes from a flawed decision1SO-may consistently
lead to overestimation of the defendant's fault. Absence of contributing fault by the plaintiff eliminates the possibility of potentially offsetting effects.I18 At the same time, small risks or moderate risks
leading to serious injuries when the cost of a safer alternative is not
prohibitive, require the kinds of juror risk-cost-utility balance most
likely to be affected by subjective factors.182
Courts have developed preventive measures to offset the problems
of juror misperceptions in a variety of contexts. From these various
approaches, a useful remedy for the particular problems caused by biases and heuristics in tort litigation can be fashioned.
B.

Approaches to the Control of Juror Misperceptions

The potential for misperceptions leading to erroneous verdicts
arises in many contexts. Courts have developed strategies to address
the problem. Constraints on jury discretion and stringent review of
jury decisions address potential errors in setting punitive damages
awards.' 8 3 Use of custom as the standard of care in professional malpractice cases' 8 4 avoids difficulties juries might have in determining
reasonable care in cases involving complex professional judgment.
The business judgment rule 185 serves the same purpose in assessing
the reasonableness of business decisions. The misperception problem
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 594-95.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
See supra references in note 6.
See supra references in note 7.
See supra references in note 6.
Baron & Hershey, supra note 7, at 570.
Rachlinski, supra note 7, at 594-95; see also supra note 155 (discussing Rachlinski's observations).
Kysar, supra note 10, at 1738.
See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpracticev. the Business Judgment
Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 597-601 (1994).
Id. at 613-17; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 51 U. PIrr. L. REV. 945 (1990) (examining the effect of the business judgment rule on corporate duties); Philip C. Sorensen, Discretion and Its
Limits-An Analytical Framework for Understandingand Applying the Duty of
Care to Corporate Directors(and Others), 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 553 (1988) (same).
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arises with some frequency in factual determinations. In tort litigation, scrutiny of jury determinations of negligence where the risk of
harm is slight has drawn occasional attention from appellate
courts.' 8 6 In securities fraud 187 and merger and valuation cases,' 8 8
the potential effect of the representativeness heuristics and outcome
bias can lead to errors. 189 One problem in securities fraud cases is the
attempt by plaintiffs to equate bad financial results alone with the
prior existence of fraud when in fact bad results may be due to negligence or even nontortious conduct.190 In merger cases an analogous
problem arises. Parties often attempt to use after-the-fact, instead of
contemporaneous, valuations to establish the value of a business for
merger purposes. Attention to the potential errors which can result
from such practices has led to the development of judicial controls.191
Nonobviousness in patent cases 19 2 presents similar difficulties. Nonobviousness must be determined at the time of the invention, not later
at the time of the litigation where judgment in hindsight could easily
influence the decision.19 3 To mitigate possible misperceptions, factual
surrogates for nonobviousness have been developed which are less
susceptible to hindsight errors. 194 A synthesis of these various elements of judicial control of factual misperception offers a viable solution to the problem of biases and heuristics in tort litigation. Each is
discussed in the following sections, and ultimately a synthesis
proposed.

186. Representative cases are Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1997);
Greene v. Sibley, Lindsey & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931); Adams v.Bullock,
125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919); Pinero v. Rite Aid of New York, Inc., 743 N.Y.S.2d 21
(App. Div. 2002); and Cain v. Rykin, 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986).
187. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990); Beck v. Mfrs.
Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987).
188. Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com, Inc., No. Civ.A. 19734, 2004 WL 1152338 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2004); Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., No. Civ.A. 18648-NC, 2004
WL 286963 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004); Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880 (Del. Ch.
2001).
189. See supra notes 41-42, 54 and accompanying text.
190. Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities FraudPleadingRequirement: Speed Bump or
. Road Block?, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 675, 688 (1996).
191. Agranoff, 791 A.2d 880.
192. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Ellicott Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 405 F.2d 1385 (Ct. Cl. 1969); see also Richard L. Robbins, Note,
Subtests of"Nonobviousness" A NontechnicalApproach to Patent Validity, 112 U.
PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964) (explaining the standard).
193. See Ellicott, 405 F.2d 1385.
194. See Graham, 383 U.S. 1.
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Jury Misperception of Risk in Torts Cases

Foreseeability of harm, though a question of fact and not often
challenged on appeal, x9 5 has on occasion drawn close examination by
appellate courts. 196 Collectively, these cases can be read as establishing a standard of rigorous scrutiny19 7 when jury determination of risk
is questionable. Some of the cases arose before behavioral research
was conducted on bias generally and juror bias specifically. Many fit
into the general fact pattern suggested above, where juror bias may be
most likely in cases to occur: small to moderate risk, serious injury,
absence of fault by the plaintiff, and no prohibitive costs associated
with safer, untaken precautions.1 98
A line of New York cases, of which two opinions were authored by
Benjamin Cardozo, 199 has dealt with the specific problems ofjury misperception of risk. The issue in these cases was whether there was
sufficient evidence of foreseeable harm to support the jury's verdict of
negligence. In two early cases, Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co.200 and Adams v. Bullock, 20 1 Judge Cardozo reversed negligence
verdicts because the evidence of foreseeable harm was insufficient. In
Greene where plaintiff was injured when she fell over defendant's employee who was working near her, Cardozo's opinion addressed the
problem that later behavioral research would recognize as hindsight
bias:
Looking back at the mishap with the wisdom born of the event, we can see
that the mechanic would have done better if he had given warning of the
change of pose. Extraordinary prevision might have whispered to him at the
moment that a warning would be helpful. What the law exacted of him,2 0how2
ever, was only the ordinary prevision to be looked for in a busy world.
195. There are relatively few cases. For a representative example, see Coleman v.
Cintas Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2001). See also Bolton v. Stone,
(1951) A.C. 850 (H.L.) (holding that risk of driving cricket ball completely out of
field onto relatively untraveled road and hitting plaintiff so small as to be
unforeseeable).
196. See cases cited supra note 186.
197. I use the term "rigorous" to suggest closer than usual examination to distinguish
this type of review from the "strict scrutiny" standard used in constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973)
(applying strict scrutiny to excessive entanglement of government and religion);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny in free
speech context).
198. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text. Note, however, that Adams v.
Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919), does not totally fit this pattern, since the cost of
safer alternatives may have been prohibitive.
199. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsey & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931); Adams, 125 N.E.
93.
200. 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
201. 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
202. Greene, 177 N.E. at 416.
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In Adams a child was injured when a wire he dangled over the
defendant's bridge came into contact with un-insulated electric trolley
wires running beneath the bridge. 203 The jury's verdict that the risk
of injury by the defendant's failure to guard against such a risk was
foreseeable enough to sustain a judgment of negligence was upheld on
first appeal. 2 04 Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals,
20 5
saw the situation differently and reversed.
We think the verdict cannot stand.., we think there is no evidence that this
duty [to adopt precautions to prevent the injury] was ignored .... Only some
extraordinary causality, not falling within the area of ordinary prevision,
could make it [the arrangement of wires under the bridge] a thing of danger.
Reasonable care... imparts a high degree of vigilance .... But no vigilance,
however alert, unless justified by the gift of prophecy, could have predicted...
where such an accident would occur.... We think
the ordinary caution did not
20 6
involve forethought of this extraordinary peril.

Two recent New York tort cases have continued Cardozo's close scrutiny of the sufficiency of evidence of foreseeable harm to support a negligence verdict. In Di Ponzio v.Riordan,207 plaintiff, a customer on
the premises of defendant's filling station, was injured when another
customer's unattended vehicle rolled backward into the plaintiff. Defendant's alleged negligence was failure to train employees to comply
with company policy to instruct customers to turn off their vehicle's
engines when refueling (presumably to reduce fire hazard). 208 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals found no liability:
[T]he accident was, at most, a remote possibility ... and thus was not a
foreseeable consequence of the attendant's inaction, even though the risk may
now readily be perceived through hindsight ....209

Di Ponzio's approach is seen again in Pinero v. Rite Aid of New York,
Inc.210 Plaintiff was injured when she fell in defendant's store while
reaching for a box of macaroni and cheese the defendant's assistant
manager was attempting to pass to her over a metal cart blocking the
211
aisle. Summary judgment for the defendant was upheld on appea
on the basis of no evidence of a foreseeably hazardous condition. The
court of appeals relied on Di Ponzio's observations that "'although virtually any untoward consequence can theoretically be foreseen 'with
the wisdom born of the event'.., the law draws a line between remote
203. The child was 12 years old and the wire he was swinging from was eight feet long.
Apparently, contributory fault of the plaintiff was not an issue in the case.
204. Adams, 125 N.E. at 93.
205. Id. at 94.
206. Id. at 93.
207. 679 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1997).
208. Id. at 617.
209. Id. at 620.
210. 743 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 2002).
211. Id. at 22.
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possibilities and those that are reasonably foreseeable."' 2 12 No factual issue of negligence necessitated submitting the case to the jury.
Cain v. Rijken,213 an Oregon case, also deals with evidentiary sufficiency to establish foreseeability of harm. In a wrongful death action
the defendant hospital allegedly negligently failed to treat an outpatient whose subsequent careless driving caused the plaintiffs
death. 2 14 The court left the issue of sufficiency of evidence on foreseeability of a driving risk to the jury, 215 but only after more than usual
scrutiny by the appellate court:
The fact that Rijken [the outpatient] had been involved in the previous offense
described did not in itself make the (fatal) collision with Cain foreseeable.
Careless or reckless driving habits are hardly limited to psychiatric outpatients. With hindsight's 20/20 vision, it is easy to say that Providence [the
defendant hospital] should have foreseen that Rijken presented a risk to the
public at large. Proof aided by hindsight that the therapist judged wrongly is
insufficient to establish negligence. Foreseeability is measured by the way
understood the situation as it existed
that a reasonable person should 2have
16
without the benefit of hindsight.

The court proceeded to examine other specific evidence bearing on
foreseeability in addition to the defendant's prior driving accident and
the therapist's misjudgment. 21 7 Based on the totality of the evidence
on foreseeability, the court determined the case was sufficient for sub2 18
mission to a jury.
Unlike the clear-error standard used by appellate courts in reviewing most questions of fact, 2 19 these cases can be read as establishing a
different, more rigorous standard. These illustrative cases span a period of some eighty years, both before and after behavioral research on
biases and heuristics started. They deal with situations of outcome
bias (the therapist's misjudgment in Cain) and possible hindsight bias
(in Green, Adams, Di Ponzio, and Pinero), where jurors would have
212. Id. (quoting Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 619).
213. 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986).
214. An outpatient of the defendant hospital suffered hallucinatory episodes which
were known to the hospital, and to a defendant-therapist who misjudged his potential dangerousness. Id. at 142.
215. Id. at 149.
216. Id.
217. The additional factors relevant to whether the risk was foreseeable were Rijken's
deteriorating mental condition, his relationship with a therapist, his outpatient
status with diminished ability by the defendant hospital to control his behavior,
no observation of any threat by Rijken to cause harm or drive recklessly, and his
involvement in a serious collision three years earlier. These factors all raised
inferences (sometimes conflicting) relevant to whether the defendant hospital
should have taken Rijken into custody. Id. at 148.
218. Id. at 149.
219. See, e.g., Koshiba v. Merck & Co., 384 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2004) (using clear-error
test); Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 874 So. 2d 90, 98 (La. 2004) (using manifest-error
standard); cf. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d) (findings of fact by jury set aside only if no
material evidence to support the verdict).
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known of the injury resulting from a small risk. In appropriate situations, these cases indicate that evidentiary sufficiency of foreseeability
of harm should be evaluated by a rigorous-scrutiny standard. In the
context of these cases, rigorous scrutiny means particularly close reviews of evidence which could be affected by "prevision" 2 20 or "hindsight."221 Where these possibilities are significant, courts reversed
jury verdicts based on insufficient evidence of foreseeability by closely
scrutinizing the sufficiency of specific facts relevant to foreseeability.
D.

Securities Fraud Cases

A group of cases quite removed from these tort cases exhibits a
similar concern with the potentially pernicious effects of juror misperception. Securities fraud cases are potentially susceptible to errors
from hindsight and outcome bias. 22 2 In statutory securities fraud
cases, claims based only on evidence that the financial condition of the
organization has deteriorated have drawn particularly close scrutiny. 223 Courts need a clear dividing line between negligence and
fraud in such situations. Claims which can survive summary judgment usually have significant settlement value, necessitating a standard which strikes a balance between pursuing claims of plaintiffs in
suits where fraud is a distinct possibility, and protecting defendants
from the significant expense of defending against non-actionable negligence claims.
To address the problem, Rule 9(b) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure requires that in "averments of fraud.. . the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." 22 4 A
1995 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 also addresses the same issue. 22 5 The amendment requires that complaints
alleging fraud and seeking money damages "with respect to each act
or omission alleged to violate [the 1934 Act], state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
22 6
the required state of mind."
This amendment incorporated the holdings of some prior decisions
dealing with the issue into the Act. In DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 22 7 a
220. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
221. Di Ponzio v. Riordan, 679 N.E.2d 616, 620 (N.Y. 1997); Rykin, 717 P.2d at 149.
222. "Courts uniformly refuse to allow plaintiffs to claim fraud by pointing to the inconsistency [between two different financial reports, the latest one initiating a
decline in the company's financial status], noting that such a claim amounts to no
more than 'fraud by hindsight.'" Weiss, supra note 190, at 688. See also DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1990).
223. DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 627-28.
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).
226. Id.
227. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
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securities fraud allegation was dismissed because the plaintiff made
no specific allegation of fraud. The complaint alleged only that the
defendant-accountant had knowledge that a bank was experiencing
financial reverses on problem loans and the bank's loan reserves were
inadequate. 228 Plaintiffs alleged that this knowledge, coupled with
the adverse change noted on the bank's financial report, constituted
fraud.
Because only a fraction of financial deteriorations reflect fraud, plaintiff may
not proffer the different financial statements and rest. Investors must point
to some facts suggesting that the difference is attributable to fraud .... Rule
9(b) required the district court to dismiss the complaint, which discloses none
of the circumstances that might separate fraud from the benefit of hindsight.
229
There is no "fraud by hindsight" in Judge Friendly's felicitous phrase.

The requirement of pleading with particularity is satisfied by pleading
facts which suggest the defendant either had malice and opportunity
to misrepresent material facts or consciously or recklessly misrepresented material facts. If the plaintiff is unable to plead such facts, the
strength of circumstantial evidence must be correspondingly
greater. 23 0 One commentator surveying the cases in light of the 1995
amendment has proposed that courts must articulate the inferences
that can be drawn from facts bearing on fraud and avoid broad behavioral assumptions (such as accountants are generally honest), since
drawing inferences from such generalizations instead of from specific
facts is prone to error. 2 3 1 Since conflicting inferences can be drawn
from the fact that a business's financial condition has worsened, the
potential for jurors to draw unsupported conclusions of fraud merely
from the knowledge of a bad financial result (outcome bias) must be
protected against.
The solutions to these problems in fraud cases and the problems of
insufficient evidence of foreseeability of harm in negligence cases offer
useful parallels. In both areas, bias may influence juror decisions.
Requirements of pleading facts with specificity address the problems
in fraud cases. Precedent for a similar approach can be found in
tort. 23 2 The end result in both areas is the same: more rigorous scrutiny and additional specificity regarding facts relied on to prove either
fraud or foreseeability of harm where bias is known to affect results.
E.

Nonobviousness Cases in Patent Law

Hindsight bias is potentially a problem in patent cases as well. After the fact and looking back, misjudgment about the nonobviousness
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 627-28.
Id. (citing Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.)).
Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1987).
Weiss, supra note 190, at 695.
See Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140 (Or. 1986).
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of any invention at the time of its invention, a requirement of patentability, 23 3 is all too easy to make. "Since hindsight is often difficult to
avoid in determining obviousness of inventions, it is frequently helpful
to inquire into the problem in the art to which the invention was directed as a guide to what those skilled in the art would have consid2 34
ered obvious."
The Supreme Court has looked to surrounding circumstances, such
as commercial success, a long-felt but unsatisfied need, and failure of
others to discover a solution which "might be utilized to give light to
the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be protected." 2 35 "The difficulties [in determining nonobviousness]
are comparable to those encountered by the court in such frames of
reference as negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a
case-by-case development." 2 36 The solution here is to articulate factual surrogates for nonobviousness that have specific relevance on the
issue but are not susceptible to bias- and heuristic-induced errors.
Commercial success, a long-felt but unmet need, and failure of others
to solve the problem at the time of the invention collectively support
the inference of nonobviousness at the time of the invention. Otherwise, the market would have responded and fulfilled the need.
In this area as well, a narrowly tailored judicial solution to a factual determination susceptible to bias-induced errors has been developed, analogous to approaches in the securities fraud and tort cases.
F.

Valuation Cases in Mergers and Acquisitions

A series of Delaware Chancery Court cases deal expressly with the
potential effects of biases and heuristics where the issue is corporate
valuations in mergers and aquisitions. 23 7 Judges in nonjury trials, 238
after the fact, must determine the fair market value of corporate assets at the time of a merger or acquisition. Valuation must be determined by looking back at the value of the assets at the time of the
agreement. Experts typically offer opinions based on various valuation models. 2 39 The position of the Chancery Court is that management projections made contemporaneously with the merger are the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1385, 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., No. Civ.A. 19734, 2004 WL 1152338 (Del. Ch.
May 21, 2004); Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisitions Corp., No. Civ.A. 18648-NC, 2004
WL 286963 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004); Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880 (Del. Ch.
2001).
238. Behavioral studies indicate judges are subject to the effect of biases as well as
jurors. See Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 803.
239. Cede, 2004 WL 286963, at *2; see also Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663,
669 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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most reliable indicator of value. 2 40 Experts often attempt to deviate
from such contemporaneous projections using after the fact assumptions. The Chancery Court has indicated considerable skepticism
about such "litigation-driven" forecasts. 241 "Contemporaneous premerger management projections are particularly useful ... because
management projections, by definition, are not tainted by post-merger
hindsight."242 In contrast, post-hoc litigation-driven forecasts have an
"untenably high"243 probability of containing "hindsight bias and
other cognitive biases." 2 44 On this issue, "this Court . . . holds a
healthy skepticism of post-merger adjustment to management
projections .... Expert valuations that completely disregard contemporaneous management projections are sometimes completely
2
discounted." 45
This court of special jurisdiction has clearly identified the particular problems of cognitive biases as a recurring issue and has fashioned
a remedy where the problem is most likely to occur. It has laid down a
bright-line test to avoid the problems in valuation cases. Evidence
with the potential of injecting bias even into decisions by judges is
viewed with an "appropriately high level of skepticism"246 or is given
it no weight. 247 In effect, the Delaware Chancery Court has fashioned
a rigorous-scrutiny standard when considering evidence on an issue
where the effect of various biases may come into play.
G.

A Proposal for Dealing with Errors Caused by Biases and
Heuristics in Torts Litigation

These groups of cases establish principles useful in addressing the
problem of biases and heuristics in tort litigation. The proposal is as
follows:
1. The types of cases most likely to be affected by biases and heuristics can be broadly identified in advance. Most likely to be affected
are cases with facts suggesting small to moderate risks, relatively
serious harm, absence of contributing fault by the plaintiff, no violation of statute or custom, and the availability of alternative safer
conduct which does not appear to be prohibitively expensive.
240. Cede, 2004 WL 286963, at *2; see also Gilbert, 709 A.2d at 669.
241. Doft, 2004 WL 1152338, at *6.
242. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ.A. 7129, 2003 WL 23104613, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 31, 2003).
243. Agranoffv. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001).
244. Id.
245. Cede, 2004 WL 286963, at *2.
246. Doft, 2004 WL 1152338, at *7.
247. Cede, 2004 WL 286963, at *2.
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2. Where this fact pattern exists, both trial and appellate courts may
employ a rigorous-scrutiny standard to test the sufficiency of evidence proferred on issues involving risk.
3. Rigorous scrutiny may require pleading with specificity facts relevant to risk instead of a general allegation of foreseeability of
2 48
harm.
4. Rigorous scrutiny may require review beyond the usual deference
given to jury determination of fact and may require articulation of
2 49
the inferences about risk raised by specific facts.
This proposal avoids across-the-board reforms, which could cause
as many problems as they resolve by neglecting the potentially offsetting operation of conflicting biases and by affecting cases where the
effect of biases may be relatively insignificant. 250 It can be utilized on
a case-by-case basis and only where necessary and appropriate. It
places control of the bias problem with judges. It also employs techniques such as pleading with specificity and heightened scrutiny
which have been used in other contexts and with which lawyers and
judges are familiar. Where used, this proposal may require more rigorous discovery and development of proof of facts bearing on risk earlier in the litigation process. As a result, summary judgment may
become a more widespread tool for screening cases when foreseeability
of harm does not support tort liability.
This proposal may be used in conjunction with other procedural
approaches which have been suggested as useful in dealing with errors from biases and heuristics. Research on a requirement for unanimous verdicts suggests that jurors are more deliberative about
outcomes when unanimity is required, including deliberation about
potential errors and proof burdens. 25 1 Bifurcated trials on the issues
of liability and damage may also be useful. Delaying juror knowledge
of the extent of plaintiffs harm may reduce the effect of outcome bias,
even though it probably cannot be eliminated completely. 2 52 There
are also techniques available to defense counsel during voir dire, presentation of evidence, and in closing arguments, that suggest that the
effect of bias may be reduced by defense counsel tactics.25 3 This proposal has the virtue of operating more selectively than other reforms,
even relatively modest ones such as elevation of the plaintiffs burden
248. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
249. Weiss, supra note 190, at 695.
250. See Jolls et al., supra note 10; Peters, supra note 15; Rachlinski, supra note 7.
Peters's review is particularly useful.
251. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 173, 229 (1983).

252. David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for JurorHindsight Bias in Mental Health MalpracticeLitigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 485, 493-97 (1989); see also NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 274 (1995).
253. Stallard & Worthington, supra note 158, at 675.
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of proof.2 54 While making it more difficult for the plaintiff to prevail
where risk is relatively modest, an increased burden would also elevate plaintiffs burden on every issue in a negligence case, including
causation and damages. As a result, defendants may obtain an unfair
advantage in close cases. The rigorous-scrutiny proposal developed
here, coupled with selective use of other techniques, offers a way to
control potential errors attributable to biases and heuristics.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Biases and heuristics may affect jurors in actual litigation. In fact,
the effects are most likely in cases of modest risk, severe injury, absence of fault of the plaintiff, no statutory or custom violations, and
where alternative conduct is not prohibitively expensive. In such
cases, juror bias may cause unjustified liability and unfair results.
Some broad proposals to deal with the problem would radically change
the torts system and could produce unintended consequences. A caseby-case solution is more appropriate. Cases where biases are most
likely can be identified in advance. In these cases a rigorous-scrutiny
standard on facts tending to prove risk, coupled with more rigorous
pleading requirements, would permit judges to deal with bias issues.
Remaining tort cases, where the actual effect of biases awaits further
behavioral research, would not be affected. This approach offers a
way to reduce the potential for erroneous, unfair judgments while preserving the fundamental norms and procedures of tort litigation.

254. Jolls et al., supra note 10, at 1528.

